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the latest modern philosophy and science, retaining its comprehensiveness, its unity, its earnest spirit, and its educational ideal. When this is done, our education will cease to be chaotic and tentative, and become consistent, comprehensive, and aimful, from the kindergarten to the university, from the cradle to the grave and, further, forever further.\*

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

## PHILOSOPHY AND THE ACTIVITY-EXPERIENCE.

It requires no very profound acquaintance with the trend of the literature of general and specialized philosophy of the last twenty-five years to detect a decidedly practical turn in the recent speculative tendencies of philosophy and philosophers. The older conception of philosophy or metaphysics as an attempt to state (more or less systematically) the value of the world for thought is being slowly modified, if not altogether disappearing, into the attempt to explain or to grasp the significance of the world from the stand-point of the moral and social activity of man. The philosophical student must be to some extent conscious of the difference in respect both of tone and subject-matter between such books as Stirling's "Secret of Hegel," E. Caird's "Critical Philosophy of Kant" (the first editions of both works), Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," and the most recent essays and books of Professors A. Seth † and James ‡ and Ward § and Sidgwick || and Bald-

\* In preparing this article, I have been very largely indebted to the works of Prof. Dieterici, of Berlin, to whom belongs the credit of having made the "Brothers of Sincerity" and their *Cyclôpædia* known to the modern world.

T. D.

† "Man's Place in the Cosmos," a book consisting of essays and reviews, published by the author during the last four or five years. They all advocate "humanism in opposition to naturalism," or "ethicism in opposition to a too narrow intellectualism." The review of this book by Dr. Douglas, in *Mind* (January, 1898), seems to me to emphasize its main characteristic,—the necessity, even for speculative purposes, of a recognition of the practical problems of man's life.

‡ "The Will to Believe," 1897.

§ "Progress in Philosophy," art. *Mind*, 15, p. 213.

|| "Practical Ethics;" Essays.

win,\* and of Mr. Bosanquet† and the late Mr. Nettleship,‡ and between—to turn to Germany—the writings of Erdmann and Kuno Fischer and Zeller and F. A. Lange, and those of Gizycki, Paulsen, Windelband, Evcken, Hartmann, Deussen, Simmel, and—in France—between the writings of Renouvier and Pilon and Ravaisson, the “Neo-Kantianism” of the *Critique Philosophique* (1872–1887), and those of Fouillée, Weber (of Strassbourg), Séailles, Dunan, and others, and of general writers like de Vogüé, Desjardins, and Brunetière, and of social philosophers like Bouglé, Tarde, Izoulet, and so on. The change of *venue* in these writers alone, not to speak of the change of the interest of the educated world from such books as Huxley’s “Hume” and Renan’s “L’Avenir de la Science” and Du Bois Reymond’s “Die Sieben Welträthsel,” and Tyndall’s “Belfast Address,” to the writings of Herbert Spencer (the *Sociology* and the general essays on social evolution), Kidd, Nordau, Nietzsche, Mr. Crozier (his important “History of Civilization”), and Demolins§, and the predomi-

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\* “Mental Development—Social and Ethical Interpretations” (a work crowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark). We can see in this book how a psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and ethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of even the individual mind. We may indeed say that the individualistic intellectualism of the older psychology is now no more. It was too “abstract” a way of looking at mind. Professor Royce, it is well known, has given, from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician, a cordial welcome to the work of Professor Baldwin. In an important review of Mr. Stout’s two admirable volumes on “Analytic Psychology” (*Mind*, July, 1897), Professor Royce has insisted strongly upon the need of supplementing introspection by the “interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people” if we would know much about “dynamic” psychology. It is this “dynamic” psychology—the “dynamics” of the will and of the “feelings”—that I think constitutes such an important advance upon the traditional “intellectual” and “individualistic” psychology.

† “The Psychology of the Moral Self.” Macmillan, 1897. I have tried, in a short notice of this book in the *Philosophical Review* (March, 1898), to indicate the importance of some of its chief contentions.

‡ “Philosophical Lectures and Remains,” edited by Professor Bradley.

§ Editor of *La Science Sociale*. His recent work on the “Superiority of the Anglo-Saxons” (*À quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons*)—a chapter in the study of the conditions of race survival—ran through seventeen editions in a few months, and set the whole press of France and Germany (other countries following suit) into commotion, as well as calling forth *pronunciamentos* from

nance of investigations into general biology and comparative psychology and sociology over merely logical and conceptual philosophy seem to afford us some warrant for trying to think of what might be called a newer or ethical idealism, an idealism of the will, an idealism of life, in contradistinction to the older or intellectual (epistemological, Neo-Kantian) idealism, the idealism of the intellect. Professor A. Seth, in his recent volume on "Man's Place in the Cosmos," suggests that Mr. Bradley's treatise on "Appearance and Reality" has closed the period of the absorption or assimilation of Kanto-Hegelian principles by the English mind. And there is ample evidence in contemporary philosophical literature to show that even the very men who have, with the help of Stirling and Green and Caird and Bradley and Wallace, "absorbed and assimilated" the principles of critical idealism are now bent upon applying these principles to the solution of concrete problems of art and life and conduct. Two things alone would constitute a difference between the philosophy of the last few years and that of the preceding generation: An attempt (strongly \* accentuated at the present moment) to include elements of *feeling* and *will* in our final consciousness of reality, and a

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most of the prominent editors and critics of France,—men like Jules Lemaitre, Paul Bourget, Marcel Prevost, François Coppée, Édouard Rod, G. Valbert, etc.

\* In different ways by all of the following English writers: Professor A. Seth ("It is not in knowledge, then, as such, but in feeling and action that reality is given," "Man's Place," etc., p. 122, etc., etc.), by Mr. Bradley (in "Appearance and Reality"), by Mr. Balfour (in his "Foundations of Belief"), and by Professor James. Professor Evcken, of Jena, in his different books, also insists strongly upon the idea that it is not in knowledge as such, but in the totality of our psychical experience that the principles of philosophy must be sought. Paulsen, in his "Einleitung in die Philosophie," and Weber, in his "History of Philosophy" (books in general use to-day), both advocate a kind of philosophy of the will, the idea that the world is to be regarded as a striving on the part of wills after a partly unconscious ideal. Simmel, in an important article in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, IV., 2, expresses the idea (which it would be well to recognize generally at the present time) that truth is not something objectively apart from us, but rather the name we give to conceptions that have proved to be the guides to useful actions, and so become part of the psychical heritage of human beings. Professor Ribot, of Paris, has written more extensively upon the will and the feelings than upon the intellect,—a fact in keeping with the scientific demands of our day.

tendency (inevitable since Comte and Hegel's "Philosophy of History") to extend the philosophical synthesis of the merely "external" or physical universe so as to make it include the world of man's action and the world that is now glibly called the "social organism."\* A good deal of epistemological and metaphysical philosophy of this century has been merely cosmological, and at best psychological and individualistic. The philosophy of the present is, necessarily, to a large extent, sociological and collectivistic and historical. Renan once prophesied that this would be so. And many other men perceived the same fact and acted upon their perception of it—Goethe and Victor Hugo and Carlyle, for example.

To be sure, any attempt to draw lines of novel and absolute separation between writers of to-day and their immediate predecessors would be absurd and impossible, just as would be the attempt to force men who are still living and thinking and developing, into Procrustean beds of system and nomenclature. The history of the philosophy of the last half of this century constitutes a development as continuous and as logical as the philosophy of any similar period of years wherein men have thought persistently and truly upon the problems of life and mind. There were in the sixties men like Ulrici and Lotze (Renouvier, too, to some extent) who divined the limitations of a merely intellectual philosophy, and who saw clearly that the only way to effect a reconciliation between philosophy and science would be to apply philosophy itself to the problems of the life and thought of the time, just as we find, in 1893, Dr. Edward Caird writing, in his "Essays on Literature and Philosophy," that "philosophy, in face of the increasing com-

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\* See, e.g., an article by Fouillée in the *Revue Philosophique*, XXI., 5, with the very title "Nécessité d'une interprétation psychologique et sociologique du monde." Fouillée finds there, as he does elsewhere, that (*à la* Schopenhauer) will is the principle that enables us to unify the physical with the psychical world,—an illustration of the fact that the two characteristics I am referring to are really one. A present instance of the introduction of the element of will (the will of man, even) is to be seen in the contention of such a book as M. Lucien Arréat's "Les Croyances de Demain" (1898). According to *Mind*, M. Arréat proposes to substitute the idea that man can by his efforts bring about the supremacy of justice for the traditional idea that justice reigns in the universe.

plexity of modern life, has a harder task laid upon it than ever was laid upon it before. It must emerge from the region of abstract principles and show itself able to deal with the manifold results of empirical science, giving to each of them its proper place and value." Professor Campbell Fraser, while welcoming and sympathetically referring to (in his books upon Berkeley and Locke) the elements of positive value in English and German idealism, has throughout his life contended for the idea (expressed with greatest definiteness in his Gifford Lectures on "The Philosophy of Theism") that "in man, as a self-conscious and self-determining *agent*," is to be found the "best key we possess to the solution of the ultimate problem of the universe;" while Professor Sidgwick, by virtue of his captivating and ingenious pertinacity in confining philosophical speculation to the lines of the traditional English empiricism, and in keeping it free from the ensnaring subtleties of "system" and "methodology," has exercised a healthful and corrective influence against the extremes alike of transcendentalism and naturalism. And it would be rash to maintain that all the younger men in philosophy show an intention to act upon the idea (expressed by Wundt, for instance, in his "Ethik") that a metaphysic should build upon the facts of the moral life of man; although we find a "Neo-Hegelian" like Professor Mackenzie\* saying that "even the wealth of our inner life depends rather on the width of our objective interests than on the intensity of our self-contemplation;" and an expounder of the ethics of dialectic evolution like Professor Muirhead quoting † with approval the thought expressed by George Eliot in the words, "The great world-struggle of developing thought is continually foreshadowed in the struggle of the affections seeking a justification for love and hope;" and a careful psychologist like Mr. Stout deliberately penning the words,‡ "Our existence as conscious beings is essentially an activity, and activity is a process which,

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\* "Manual of Ethics," according to Mr. Stout, *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, October, 1894. There are many similar sentences and ideas in the book.

† "Elements of Ethics," p. 232.

‡ *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, October, 1894, p. 119.

by its very nature, is directed towards an end, and can neither exist nor be conceived apart from this end." There are, doubtless, many philosophers of to-day who are convinced that philosophy is purely an intellectual matter, and can never be anything else than an attempt to analyze the world for *thought*—an attempt to state its value in the terms of thought. Against all these and many similar considerations it would be idle to set up a hard and fast codification or characterization of the work of the philosophy or philosophers of to-day. Still, the world will accord the name of philosopher to any man—Renan, for example, or Spencer or Huxley or Nordau or Nietzsche—who comes before it with views upon the universe and humanity that may, for any conceivable reason, be regarded as fundamental. And on this showing of things, as well as from many indications in the work of those who are philosophers by profession, it may be said that the predominating note of the newer philosophy is its openness to the facts of the volitional and emotional and moral and social aspects of man's life, as things that take us further along the path of truth than the mere categories of thought and their manipulation by metaphysic and epistemology. It is, however, not so much upon the actual history of the modification, as to form and subject-matter, of the traditional post-Kantian philosophy that I wish to dwell, as upon some of the constituent elements or possible leading conceptions of the newer positive philosophy of to-day, called by whatever name may appear to be most expressive and appropriate.

I have employed in the title of this paper the expression "the activity-experience" out of a desire to speak of a certain *rapprochement* that may be to-day observed between philosophy (conceived of—to put it broadly—in the classical sense as the Theory of the Ideas) and the actual practical effort that characterizes the life of man, that brings him, as we say, his experience or wisdom of life. It may seem somewhat illogical to place together, even by way of antithesis, two such apparently "disparate" notions as "philosophy" and "activity,"—a *theory* and a *thing* (or fact). The considerations of the argument to follow may perhaps tend to remove this appear-

ance of inconsistency or irrelevancy. A more serious initial reflection (one, too, that opens up our very subject) arises in my mind regarding what has been called the *automatism*\* of the recent psychology, its claim that there is in the mind of man no evidence of self-engendered effort, of spontaneous activity, of activity essentially different from sensation and affection.† I pass over this reflection, however, with two remarks: (1) Human beings themselves and history and literature all seem to speak of a life of effort and creative activity and spontaneity as of the very nature of man. This fact alone is enough for my purpose. (2) It would also be enough for my purpose to speak of the "*alleged* activity-experience" instead of the "activity-experience." The mere *belief* in activity, and the facts and necessities of the practical life, and reflection upon that belief and upon these facts and these necessities, have, in my opinion, modified the traditional metaphysical monism or the critical philosophy of recent years. If a belief in the activity or spontaneity of man's mind or brain has produced, as it most certainly has, results in the world of achievement and conduct and in the world of religion and art, these results are sufficient reason for investigating and guarding and cultivating that belief. The study of evolution, as well as the study of psychology, has made us aware of the fact that it is "function," or adaptation to needs and purposes, that measures reality.

The newer idealism does not dream of questioning the positive work of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealists. It knows only too well that even "scientific" men like Helmholtz and Du Bois Reymond, that "positive" philosophers like Riehl and Laas and Feuerbach and others have, through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, learned and

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\* Professor Seth, op. cit., p. 64, "The 'New' Psychology and Automatism."

† Professor Titchener, "An Outline of Psychology." It is really to Professor Titchener that I am indebted for the expression, "the activity-experience," although I think I have seen it elsewhere. He distinguishes it from the "activity-inference," implying that our whole theory of "activity" is in itself a matter of inference and supposition. I attempted a criticism of this and other points in his book in a paper read (December, 1897) before the American Psychological Association, published in the *Psychological Review* (1898).



accepted the fact of there being "ideal" or psychical or "mind-supplied" factors in so-called external reality. There are among the educated men of to-day very few Dr. Johnsons who ridicule the psycho-physical analysis of external reality, who believe in a crass and crude and self-sufficient "matter" utterly devoid of psychical attributes or characteristics. True, Herbert Spencer has written words to the effect that "If the Idealist (Berkeley) is right, then the doctrine of Evolution is a dream;" but then everything in Spencer's philosophy about an "actuality lying behind appearances" and about our being compelled "to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon," is against the possibility of our believing that, according to that philosophy, an unconscious and non-spiritual "matter" could evolve itself into conscious life and moral experience. The philosophers of to-day have indeed rejoiced to see Kant's "lesson" popularized by such various phases and movements of human thought as psycho-physical research, art and æsthetic theory, the interest in Buddhism (with its idealistic theory of the knowledge of the senses), and the speculative biology of Weismann and others. That people generally should see that matter is, for many reasons, something more than mere matter, is to the student of Kant a piece of fulfilled prophecy. By a plea for a return to reality and life and sociability from conceptualism and criticism and speculative individualism no philosophical scholar for one moment contemplates as ever conceivable an overlooking of the idealistic interpretation of the data of the senses supplied by Locke and Berkeley and Hume, or of the idealistic interpretation of the data of science and understanding supplied by Kant's "Copernican" discovery. Any real view of the universe must now presuppose the melting down of crass external reality into the phenomena of sense and experience and the transformation of inorganic and organic nature into so many *planes* or *grades* of being expressive of the different forms (gravitation, cohesion, vital force, psychic force) in which cosmic energy manifests itself.

Equally little does the Newer Idealism question the legiti-

macy or the actual positive service of the "dialectic" (Hegel's "Logic," to wit, as Archimedean a leverage to humanity as was the "concept" of Socrates or the "causal category" of Kant) that has shown the world to be a *system* in which everything is related to everything else, and shown, too, that all ways of looking at reality that stop short of the truths of personality and moral relationship are untrue and inadequate. To use the words of Professor Howison, of California, in the preface to the first edition of Professor Watson's latest volume (a book that connects the idealism of Glasgow and Oxford with the convictions of the youth of the "Pacific Coast"), the "*dominant tone*" of the militant and representative philosophy of to-day, is "affirmative and idealistic. The decided majority . . . are animated by the conviction that human thought is able to solve the riddle of life positively; to solve it in accord with the ideal hopes and interests of human nature." Only whenever I read such words as *affirmative* and *idealistic*, or their equivalent, in writers like Watson or James or Seth or Fouillée or Desjardins or Nettleship or Paulsen or Simmel or Windelband, or in a host of others, I say to myself (what, I think, is one of the characteristics of the newer philosophy) "it means the *will*; means that the *will* [Schopenhauer] as well as the intellect [Kant] is implied in our construction and interpretation of reality; means that the universe is partly what we make it to be, what we must make it to be, what the best of men endeavor to make it to be, what humanity as a whole may endeavor to make it to be; means that the universe is this, and not merely, as Kant and Hegel have forever taught us, what we must *think* it to be. Nay, rather, it means that we are compelled to think the universe to be what the necessities of our practical nature demand that it shall be [Kant suggested this, although Spinoza thought it a reason for denying a knowledge of *final causes*], that for philosophy as for psychology, reality is simply whatever sustains a verifiable relation (positive or limitative) to our activity." I am aware of a great many things that these statements are apt to suggest, such as "philosophizing with one's heart and inclinations a *l'enfant gaté* or a *la vieille femme*," or "Fichte's short cut to reality up to

date," or "Schopenhauer *minus* his pessimism," or "the mere truism that reality is and must be thought to be what it proves itself to be, proves itself to be in us." But why should not reality be considered and analyzed by philosophy as "what it *proves* itself to be"? If evolution be rational, reality must be what it proves itself in our experience to be, for man's body must be regarded as an "organism for the storage and voluntary expenditure" of cosmic energy, and man's nature and mind as an agency for bringing nature to its highest development and expression (a realm of goodness and beauty). And, again, if this "practical idealism" be at a glance detected to be merely an obverse of the intellectual idealism of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," or Hegel's "Logic"—nay, merely a rendering according to taste of the teleology of Kant's "Critique of Judgment" and Hegel's "Philosophy of History," it is none the less a new statement of the results of philosophy, for it carries with it an obligation to give a new rendering of the "principles of knowledge," an interpretation of these principles that does not seem merely to idealize away the reality of things, to reduce the world to "appearance"\* *and* (reality?), or to leave us with Fichte's conviction (or error) that knowledge somehow must always be an indirect or second-hand way to reality. If knowledge tells us something about reality that we cannot with our "whole heart" believe, if it gives us a version of reality that fails to satisfy the very knowing "power" itself, then, indeed, is Pyrrhonism the only true philosophy and indifferentism or opportunism the only true conduct. But the newer idealism honors and glorifies knowledge as most real and most reliable,

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\* Some critic recently suggested an alternative name for Mr. Bradley's book on "Appearance and Reality,"—the Disappearance of Reality. And it has always seemed to me that the defenders of a reality higher than that of science and thought (as Professor Seth makes out Mr. Bradley to be, to a certain extent) ought to be very careful about seeming unduly to disparage the reality that is before us and the "life that now is." Reality must always be found in appearance, and not altogether "above" it and "beyond" it. See my "Schopenhauer's System, etc.," pp. 448-450, etc. The principles of knowledge do not (as a superficial study of even Kant might lead us to suppose) apply to a reality "outside" the mind; they are simply a statement of the essential nature of our experience, of our experience reduced to its simplest elements.

as telling us not what reality is *in itself*—this very idea being nonsensical, as every one now (thanks to Hegel) knows—but what reality is in relation to our activity, as constituting for us an actual grasp or leverage (this is no mere metaphor) on things, whereby we can raise ourselves on to higher planes of vision and conduct. I find this view of knowledge suggested in Professor Ward's *Britannica* articles on psychology (in his exposition of the memory-continuum as a differentiation of the perception-continuum) and in Mr. Stout's two volumes on "Analytic Psychology" and in the philosophy that may be built upon Professor James's "Will to Believe," and upon Professor A. Seth's "Mr. Balfour and his Critics," and in Mr. Bosanquet's recent *opuscule* on the "Psychology of the Moral Self." The reader has but to convince himself, by psychological and psycho-physical investigation, of the truth of the fact that our conceptions or ideas and the conceptions and ideas of humanity represent the history of the differentiation of our practical needs and tendencies; and then to master the meaning of Hegel's criticism of Kant's "Thing-in-Itself," to clear his mind of any and all difficulties connected with the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, doubts that he may have been led to entertain about the reality of our experience, from an acceptance of the so-called doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge. This doctrine does not mean what we used to suppose it did mean when studying Protagoras and Ænesidemus and modern Agnosticism, that the senses and understanding are not reliable guides as to the nature of reality; but rather that the data of knowledge and investigation *are* reliable because they tell us the relation that "things" and the "world" sustain to the movement of our bodies and the evolution of our life, or the relation that our life sustains to the life or evolution of the universe.

When once we grasp the true nature of the self, with which, of course, knowledge or reflection (*Besonnenheit*) is intimately associated, we see clearly that we cannot think of the self without at the same time affirming it. Affirmation—in other words, the affirmation in the simplest judgment—is not merely logical but also volitional. We cannot think of an "ideal

content" of the mind (goodness, *e. g.*, beauty, sociability), or of a definite relation to the world of men and things, to—

"This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England;  
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,"

without at the same time affirming it; and by *affirming* I mean *acting, living, willing*, as if that notion of the mind were real—real somehow in our very consciousness of it. I believe that the newer psychology and sociology (philosophy of society) and philosophy generally, have a better conception of the *organic* nature of the self than the traditional metaphysic since 1781, and with a better conception of the nature of organism as applied to the self, also a better conception of the application of this notion to nature and to humanity.

It has been the vogue among educated people to make merry over the idea of Schopenhauer and Hartmann that humanity may some time rise to such an acute consciousness of the unsatisfactory character of all material life as to actually will to suppress that life in the interest of non-existence, as something preferable to a life of unending illusion. But, fantastical though this notion at first seems to be, there is implied in it at least that perception of the organic continuity of all animal and human existence for which the biology and sociology of to-day may be regarded to stand. Humanity, in virtue of a deepened consciousness of its own essential moral unity and "intellectual solidarity," and, consequently, of its collective control over most of the forces of nature and over the anti-social forces at work in certain of its own members, may *will* to rise above practical materialism and the warring of groups of human beings against groups of their fellows. With this somewhat fanciful indication of the *terrain* that may be won for a philosophy of mind and life, for a philosophy that adopts Comte's idea of arranging all knowledge and all science in view of its bearing on human life, and that takes along with this very arrangement the idealism of Plato and Schelling and Hegel, let us think of some of the many reasons why the reality of man's life as that of a being who acts and who "alone," in his action, can "achieve the impossible," as

Goethe puts it,—act in advance of the mere conceptions of his reason, should at present be made one of the fundamental data of philosophy.

First, it is almost a truism that a philosophy of volition is necessarily the best possible clue to the systematization of the world from a teleological point of view, the supreme *desideratum* of all philosophy, even of the philosophy that denies its possibility. "Only that metaphysic," says Schopenhauer,\* "is really and directly a support to ethics, which is itself ethical in its origin,—constructed, in fact, out of ethical material, the will. For this reason I could have called my metaphysic ethic with much more justification than Spinoza, with whom the word savors of irony,—a sort of *lucus a non lucendo*, in fact, since it is only through sophistry that he foists morality on to a system which has logically no room for it." Human action represents the integration and storage and expenditure for higher purposes of all the diverse forms of energy of the known universe, from gravitation up to vital or biotic force; and—what is still more important and miraculous—it also represents *in operation* the force (for thought is a *force*) of thought as not only directing the subordinate energies just referred to, but as expressing itself and its influence over the life of man. "The course of evolution . . . has been in the direction from the unorganized and inefficacious towards the organized and efficacious through the process of storing energy in appropriate forms. This has taken place by a series of successive steps, each resulting in a more efficient product; that is, one possessing, in addition to the properties of antecedent products, some new property with a special power of its own capable of better work."† The body of man no doubt represents a contrivance or organism for the highest or most highly

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\* See my "Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance," ch. vii.,—Schopenhauer's Moral Philosophy. I believe, of course, that Schopenhauer sets forth more completely than any other philosopher the reality of a philosophy of the will. The application, too, in his shorter writings and general essays, of such a philosophy to life and conduct and character, is not the least valuable part of the information he gives the world about itself.

† Lester Ward, *The Monist*, Vol. V., p. 257; "Outline of Sociology," p. 146.

economized expenditure and direction of physical or cosmic energy; and the action of man may be said to turn the forces of nature back upon themselves in an enforced subserviency to the needs of human society and of the moral and spiritual life of man. And in collective human action, in the organized volition of humanity, we have a still higher control and adaptation of the forces of the universe than in the actions of individuals or of mere groups of individuals. Man can to an almost indefinite extent make the world to be very largely what he intelligently desires it to be. It is sometimes claimed—*e.g.*, by the late Mr. Huxley in his “Romanes Lecture”—that nature is indifferent and even hostile to man, and that the whole of civilization consists in fighting and subduing the mere forces of nature; but the “slightest philosophy” (as Hume put it) will dispel altogether from the mind this fiction of any kind of “nature” whatsoever existing anterior to or independent of the intelligence and purpose that man is directly conscious of in himself.

Secondly, if we can see our way to adopt a practical principle as the most logical explanation of reality, we should be more free in our thoughts from that somewhat unfortunate sense (*le tourment de l'infini*, as Zola lately called it in an address to Paris students) of a discrepancy between philosophy and ordinary life, with which most metaphysicians seem to be afflicted, and with which the world half humorously persists in crediting them. Sincere students of philosophy have always experienced a *quasi* minor irritation of spirit on being told by their friends and by great men like Goethe, to bring themselves and their philosophy back to life or closer to life. A true philosophy, as it were, should never feel the need of coming “back to reality,” should never find itself in the position of being a mere passive spectator of “cosmic evolution,” for the impulse to think is an assertion of the impulse to live, and “conceptions” or “ideas” are an abbreviated statement of the knowledge that humanity has acquired of its environment—matter that we of to-day must use to help us still further onwards in the work of the conquest of the world and of ourselves. No philosopher of to-day has any right to think that

the world exists for thought, when comparative biology and positive psychology most conclusively show that "thought" exists for the world, for man as a weapon or instrument of conscious effort. And if, to return to our point, the solution of the world is to be found (as is the expressed or implied conviction of an increasing number of students) in the real and historical evolution of the life of man, the best way of "making a beginning" in philosophy is to analyze the *implications* of human action. For human action, in so far as it is a combination or a working together in unison of the force that we call physical and nervous energy and of the force that we call thought, is the most characteristic and expressive fact of the universe, an epitomized expression of its life.

Thirdly, the fact of volition or conduct is the only process in the world that we know "on the inside," from the "inside" outwards. All other processes of the world we know "on the outside," by their manifestations or effects rather than "in themselves," in their internal potency. That we know volition on the inside may, of course, be denied, and is denied even by men who allow themselves to be called psychologists (theorists of the "soul" or *psyche*). But let us reflect. Every philosophical student knows that it is only in the facts of "attention," and "control" and "thinking" that any unique or differentiating characteristic of human volition is to be sought and possibly found. Now it is just because of the traditional Cartesian dualism between "thought" and "extension," between "thought" and "movement" in which most of us in our feelings and associations are still steeped, despite Kantian criticism and Hegelian monism, that we still find it difficult to represent to our minds the undoubted "voluntary \* command of the motor processes of fixation" which all "voluntary command of attention" involves. Not until we have studied the physiology and the biology of the sense-organs does this difficulty disappear. When it does disappear, it disappears not because we can *think* any more easily than we could before, the interference of thought with the almost completely differ-

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\* Stout, "Analytical Psychology," I., 243.



entiated motor-apparatus of the brain; but because we have ceased to think of "thought" as "outside" movement, vainly endeavoring to influence it, and have come to regard it as itself essentially an effort or conation of which (as of other movements of our bodies, organic and systematic or localized and specialized) we are more or less immediately conscious. It is because we have learned to see, as Mr. Stout expresses it, "that all mental process as such is conation, and that the more complex and systematic it is, the more it asserts itself as independent conation." \* We know, then, *on the inside*, the "volition" that is involved in attention or control, because the apperceptive or dominating "mental systems" or sets of ideas and associations that determine attention are part of the self or character. There is in developed thinking a principle of self-determination, a psycho-physical process which itself "initiates the changes on which its propagation ultimately depends," a self-preservative *nisus* of our mental life that is "identical with its very existence." This is why men have hitherto thought that the Cartesian "Cogito ergo sum" represents the only piece of "experience" that we know "on the inside." The "cognitive † synthesis is merely the way in which active tendencies define and differentiate themselves," and of the "active tendencies" of our nature we are as surely conscious as we are of breathing or of hunger—when we understand what these last words connote. We thus seem to know "thought" and "knowledge" on the inside, because we "are ourselves necessarily concerned" ‡ in the "origination and continuance" of the very processes of thought and knowledge. "The more complex and systematic that knowledge

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\* Cf. Baldwin, "Social and Ethical Interpretations," p. 248: "All knowledge tends to lead to action." Also, p. 295: "The growth of the ethical sense is a growth in motor accommodation."

† Stout, loc. cit., II., 103. Cf. Wundt, "Phys. Psychol" (Auf., 1887), II., 471. "Angeboren ist nur in der Organisation v. s. w.—The only thing that is innate in an animal organism is the tendency to respond with appropriate movements to certain impressions from the outside; the mental representation of these movements is something that comes *after their actual performance*."

‡ Titchener, "Outline of Psychology," p. 5.

is, the more it asserts itself as independent conation." \* Thus, what we do know "on the inside" in knowledge is volition, and volition is the only thing in the world that we really know on the inside, because volition is identical with the self-preservative *nîsus* or effort that is the ultimate fact about our life, and not about it alone, but about all organized or animate life.

Fortunately, the fact of our knowing volition on the inside is conceded even by the line of argument that sums itself up in the contention that we are "conscious *automata*," † that in volition consciousness is a kind of epi-phenomenon, a mere knowledge-accompaniment or accompanying presentation (*Begleiter-scheinung*) of the adaptation or "least resistance" movement in which and in which alone the said volition consists. We are at least aware of the fact that we are acting beings, and that in our conduct the force that we absorb from the outer world is converted, through the action of our bodily and mental tendencies (as Professor Titchener would have us put it), into energy that produces new effects in the outer world itself, and that creates the institutions and agencies and customs and ideal creations of what is called civilization. In the conduct of man, and especially in the organized and socialized forms of collective human conduct, the merely physical force of the universe has become conscious of itself as modifiable or capable of being modified into psychical energy, that in its turn may react upon nature and upon humanity, for "evolution is essentially a process of storing and economizing and co-ordinating different forms of cosmical energy." Even, that is, if the roots of our actions reach down into the very depths of organic (the cellular constitution of our bodies) and inorganic (in distribution of the matter of the universe) nature, we may still be said to know our actions on the inside (and through them the whole of nature on the inside) in a way in which we know no other objects. Through the activity-experience, then, man may be said to be conscious of the whole world as the evolution of an energy or purpose that he is able in a

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\* Cf. *supra*.

† See an article by Professor Laurie, "Psycho-Physical Materialism." *Mind*, 19, 56.

measure to understand, in so far as he is conscious of the utilization (in himself and in humanity) of physical process for "ideal" ends—the conquest of the earth and of the forces that threaten civilization itself. In the language of philosophy, the activity-experience brings us into living relation with the real things and real purposes (the Platonic Ideas) of which the *world as presentation* is significant. This thought of the subserviency of the world of sense and the world of science to the commerce and the united activity of *persons*, lay, partly latent and partly patent, in the writings of Berkeley and Kant, but it required the doctrine of evolution with its "frank recognition of the oneness of all existence" and the conclusion of modern psychology, that the *measure of reality is belief* in what affects (aids or limits) our activity-experience, along with perhaps the philosophy of Schopenhauer and of Buddhism, to develop it into the possible basis of a philosophical system.

It being, according to psychology, true that knowledge reveals to us only the relations that "phenomena" and "phenomenal happenings" sustain to the movements of our bodies and the activities of our lives (evolution is every day discovering adaptations in nature when they were least of all expected), it, of course, follows that the utility and "purpose" of *all* knowledge is to be found in its "practical character," its value for the further development of our lives. All our "faculties" and susceptibilities must be regarded as biology regards the sense-organs, as means of bringing their possessor into living relation to the different phases and planes of the life of the universe. Even Lotze, many years ago, defined sensations as acts of self-assertion (*Selbstbehauptungen*) on the part of the soul in response to "interferences," a fact that connects his philosophy with that of Herbart and Leibnitz and (in a different way) with that of Schopenhauer. Fouillée in his "Idées-Forces" develops the philosophical consequences of the idea that perception is posterior to appetite, to will. Memory, as every one knows, is a tendency of the mind to retain and to reproduce the different phases or parts of an experience to which it has been subjected. And as for *thought*, we may, of

course, analyze our experience and the alleged experience of humanity in any way that we "please" (this "please," by the way, will always denote a direction of practical interest that could, with sufficient data, be determined beforehand), but the "conceptions" that we employ in thinking are always abbreviated or tentative "constructions" of material that has in its constituent elements formed part of the actual experience of ourselves and others. Conceptions that are incongruous with the continuity of our own or of the world's experience are rejected by us and are supplanted by others. The real object of knowledge is to store up reality or experience in conceptions that may, in the form of motives, influence or determine conduct, and so aid men in the evolution of their lives. It may be questioned whether there are any conceptions—"God," if you will, the "soul," "free will," "matter," "evolution," "faith," "beauty," anything—that do not represent a more or less simple or more or less complex "construction" (schematic representation, mental picture) of certain phases of reality, or of realities, that have formed part of some experience or other, and that represent an active effort on the part of the mind to use these and all experiences as means to further personal development. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu et in voluntate.* Socrates, we may remember, could not see how a man could know the better and do the worse, or how virtue could be anything other than (applied) knowledge—a proof that the hardest thinker on questions of conduct that the world has ever seen, had, in his own way, a hold of the fact (patent to every student of biology and psychology) that there is a dynamic aspect of every conception, that it is a "mental system" struggling to establish itself as victorious over other competing "mental systems" that must in their turn subordinate or co-ordinate themselves in relation to it. Indeed, the mind itself is a dynamic thing; it is the consciousness that a human being has of his life, as (*pace* Aristotle), the realization of an inward vital energy or purpose. I am willing to admit that, once "mind" has become conscious of itself, it does become a law unto itself, that it changes for man the whole face of nature,

making him feel that everything he does must be "conceived" and "born again" of the "spirit;" but my main point is that the whole content of mind is, as is now confessed by classical philosophers, an "operative content,"\* a content that is nothing if not active and practical and in process of evolution. *Je suis ce que je veux*—I am what I will, to employ the *mot* of Secretan—is true of man in so far as the reality of his being is, in "idea" and in fact, dependent upon what he rationally wills himself to be.

It has been, perhaps, somewhat customary to say that philosophy furnishes us with a *timeless* analysis of reality, an analysis that has a value for thought alone, independently altogether of the fact whether the life and thought of an age or a time is or is not expressive of the complete truth and reality of things. But if both the world and philosophers could only realize that *thought*, in its very attempt to grasp in a few bold and comprehensive conceptions the evolution of the whole world up to a given moment of time, is the most utilitarian and positive and aggressive of all forces, there would be at once far less idol-worship and far less disparagement of knowledge as such than is generally common. Hegel says somewhere in the "Logic" that it will upon reflection be found to be true that all the so-called highest things are also at the same time the most useful. Wisdom is indeed the most useful of all possessions. Philosophy will always be regarded to be what the Kantians and Neo-Kantians of our day have contended that it is,—an analysis of experience; but the philosopher may learn that experience is every day enlarging itself through feeling and through volition (the volition of moral and æsthetic conquest) and through the efforts of mankind after organized achievement. "I cannot help thinking," said the late Mr. Nettleship,† "that it would be much better for many metaphysically-minded people if they would think about the things which they happen to feel and have real ex-

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\* Bosanquet, *e.g.*, "Psychology of the Moral Self," p. 10.

† "Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Lewis Nettleship." Edited by Bradley and Benson. Macmillan, 1897. I quote from *Literature*, January 8, 1898.

perience of, instead of taking their subjects and lines of thought from other people's thinking." If philosophers would really do this, they would see somewhat more deeply than they often do into the essential unity of all experience. They would gain a consciousness of the relation of the aims and purposes of thought to the aims and purposes of all evolution and effort, to even the industrial and economic activity of man. And if they acquire this insight, as there is abundant evidence in the philosophical activity of to-day to show that they gradually are acquiring it, then the great public in its turn will see that philosophers, in endeavoring to register and record and understand all experience and to eliminate from it the errors of partial observation and partial judgment, are just as much workers as are men of science and men of affairs. Of course, too, a "clearer conception of the ultimate significance and end of all existence" will give a "clearer direction to all the aims of human exertion."\* And in this way will philosophy on its side exercise a controlling influence over the life and activity of men, becoming in practice, as in theory, the Queen of the Sciences and the Arts.

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\* Professor Clark Murray, in an interesting article on "Philosophy and Economic Life," in *The Monist*, July, 1894.